










UCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
 





   Are Some Forecasters Really Better Than Others? 
 
 
 Antonello D’Agostino and Kieran McQuinn, Central Bank of Ireland and 











UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN 
BELFIELD DUBLIN 4 Are Some Forecasters Really Better Than Others?∗
Antonello D’Agostino†
Central Bank of Ireland
Kieran McQuinn‡




JEL classiﬁcation: C53, E27, E37.
Keywords: Forecasting, Bootstrap.
Abstract
In any dataset with individual forecasts of economic variables, some forecasters will perform
better than others. However, it is possible that these ex post differences reﬂect sampling varia-
tion and thus overstate the ex ante differences between forecasters. In this paper, we present a
simple test of the null hypothesis that all forecasters in the US Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers have equal ability. We construct a test statistic that reﬂects both the relative and absolute
performance of the forecaster and use bootstrap techniques to compare the empirical results
with the equivalents obtained under the null hypothesis of equal forecaster ability. Results sug-
gests limited evidence for the idea that the best forecasters are actually innately better than
others, though there is evidence that a relatively small group of forecasters perform very poorly.
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1. Introduction
How people formulate expectations of economic variables is one of the key methodological issues
in macroeconomics. It is hardly surprising, then, there is a relatively large literature related to
surveys of professional forecasters. The properties of the forecasts undertaken by these forecasters
are important for a number of reasons.
On a practical level, surveys of professional forecasters are assuming a greater importance in
conditioning central banks’ expectations of future movements in variables such as output and in-
ﬂation. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have undertaken surveys of these forecasts
for some time, while the European Central Bank has had a survey of this type since 1999.1 There
is some evidence that the information contained in these surveys may not just complement tradi-
tional methods of forecasting, but can even, in accuracy terms, out-perform them. Ang, Bekaert
amd Wei (2007), for example, suggest that compared to macro variables and asset markets, survey
information is the best forecaster of US inﬂation.
In relation to macroeconomic theory, advocates of rational expectations have often emphasised
that for the economy to behave in a fashion that is roughly compatible with rational expectations,
all that is required is for agents to observe the forecasts of a small number of professionals who are
incentivized to produce rational unbiased forecasts.2 Whether such forecasters do indeed deliver
such unbiased forecasts has been the subject of a number of important empirical papers such as
Keane and Runkle (1992) and Bonham and Cohen (2001).
The importance of this debate about rational expectations probably accounts for the fact that
most of the literature on the properties of individual-level forecasts has focused on testing for ratio-
nality and unbiasedness. There has been very little focus however on the accuracy of these forecasts
or how this accuracy may differ across forecasters. For instance, if two individuals are both fore-
casting the series yt and one produces a set of forecasts yt + ǫ1t while the other produces a set of
forecasts yt +ǫ2t where both ǫ1t and ǫ2t are drawn from zero mean distributions, then both of these
individuals are providing unbiased forecasts. However, it ǫ1t is drawn from a distribution with a
smaller variance than ǫ2t then it is clear that the ﬁrst forecaster is doing a better job than the sec-
1See Angel Garc´ ıa and Manzanares (2007) provide a summary of the performance of this ECB survey
2Once one factors in costs of gathering information, however, there are limits to how far this argument can be taken,
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ond. If signiﬁcant variations of this kind exist across forecasters, then this should have implications
for how those involved in macroeconomic policy formulation should use data sets such as the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters and also for the public in relation to how they should process such
information.
In reality, of course, we do not get to observe individuals drawing forecasts from ﬁxed and
known ex ante statistical distributions. All we can see are the ex post forecasts that individuals have
provided. For this reason, the assessment of individual forecaster performance must deal explicitly
with sampling variation. Casual inspection over a number of periods may reveal certain forecasters
tending to reside in the upper tail of the distribution, while others appearing in the lower part.
However, this will not tell us whether these performances are relatively good (or relatively bad) in a
statistically signiﬁcant sense relative to a null hypothesis in which all individuals are drawing their
forecasts from the same distribution.
To our knowledge, there is only a small existing literature that addresses this question of whether
some forecasters are innately better than others. Stekler (1987) and Batchelor (1990) presented
evidence based on a small sample of twenty four forecasting groups predicting GNP over the period
1977-1982. The method used in these papers ascribed a rank each period to each forecaster and then
summed the ranks over a number of periods to arrive at a test statistic that was used to assess the
null hypothesis that the forecasters do not differ signiﬁcantly in their underlying ability. Batchelor
concluded that the differences in performance between forecasters in this sample did not allow one
to reject this null hypothesis of equal ability.
In this paper, we revisit this issue using data on the forecasts of individuals who participated
in the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters between 1968 and 2008. In contrast
to Stekler and Batchelor, who use a method that requires each forecaster to have a continuous
presence in the sample, we use a bootstrap technique that allows us to use data on a large number of
forecasters over a long sample. We simulate a distribution of forecast errors under the assumption of
equalunderlyingforecastabilityandcomparethesimulateddistributionsofameasureofcumulative
performance with the actual outcome. The approach we take is similar to that used in research such
as Kosowski, Timmerman, Wermers and White (2006), Fama and French (2010) and Cuthbertson,
Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2008) to assess the relative performance of mutual funds.ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS? 3
Our bootstrap technique has a number of advantages over the rank sum approach employed in
the previous tests in this area. In addition to being able to use a long unbalanced panel of microdata
on forecasts, our method allows us to go beyond testing the null hypothesis of equal forecaster
performance to providing a graphical comparison of the realized distribution of forecaster outcomes
against the distribution consistent with the null. In addition, the rank-based approach does not take
into account the absolute size of errors made by a forecaster. Our approach is based on a test statistic
for perfomance evaluation that takes into account both absolute and relative perfomance.
2. Testing for Differences in Forecaster Performance
This section outlines the previous work on assessing the signiﬁcance of differences in forecaster
performance and then describes our methodology.
2.1. Stekler’s Method
Stekler (1987) studied the forecasts of organisations that participated in the Blue Chip survey of
economic indicators between 1977 and 1982. Thirty one different organisations provided forecasts
but only twenty four provided forecasts for every period and his study restricted itself to studying
this smaller sample. Stekler’s approach assigns a score, Rijt to the ith forecaster in predicting the
jth variable in period t. This ranking procedure is repeated for each period under consideration. For
each variable, the forecaster’s scores are then summed over the whole sample of size N to produce





Under the null hypothesis of equal forecasting ability, then each individual should have an expected
rank sum score of
N(K+1)
2 where K is the number of forecasters. Batchelor points out that, under
this null, the expected rank sum has a variance of
NK(K+1)
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follows a χ2
K distribution. Batchelor shows that the results obtained in Stekler’s paper for forecasts
of real GDP and inﬂation are not above the ten percent critical value for rejecting the hypothesis
that all forecasts are drawn from the same underlying distribution.3 Thus, for these 24 forecasting
groups over this relatively short period, the evidence could be interpreted as consistent with the null
hypothesis of equal forecasting ability.
2.2. A Bootstrap Test
The rank sum approach has a number of weaknesses. It requires a balanced panel of forecasters,
which in reality is difﬁcult to obtain because participants in forecast surveys tend to move in and out
over time, so most of the information available from surveys is lost. The sum of period-by-period
ranks is also likely to provide a ﬂawed measure of forecast performance. A forecaster who occa-
sionally does well but sometimes delivers dramatically bad forecasts may score quite well on this
measure but, in reality, there would not be much demand for the professional services of someone
prone to making terrible errors. In addition, the simple accept-or-reject nature of the null hypothesis
being tested does not provide much insight into how or why the null is being accepted or rejected.
Our approach addresses each of these problems.
We measure forecaster performance as follows. For each type of forecast that we track, we
denote by Nt the number of individuals providing a forecast in period t, while the realised error of
individual i is denoted as eit. Because some periods are easier to forecast than others, we construct











This statistic controls for differences over time in the performance of all forecasters—each period
there is a common element that can lead most forecasters to be too high or too low in their forecast—
while still allowing the magnitude of the individual error to matter. For instance, an Eit of 2 would
imply that the squared error for individual i was twice the mean squared error for that period.
This method of accounting for errors does not punish forecasters simply because they contributed
3Stekler’s paper had used an incorrect formulae for the variance for the g statistic.ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS? 5
forecasts during unpredictable periods. However, the size of an individual’s error relative to the
average error for that period is taken into account.
Once these period-by-period normalised square errors have been calculated, we then assign each
forecaster an overall score based on taking an average of their normalised squared error statistics
across all the forecasts that they submitted. For a forecaster who ﬁrst appears in the sample in period
t = TS and last appears in the sample in period t = TE, this score is
Si =
1




Our approach to testing the hypothesis of equal forecaster ability can be summarised as follows.
Suppose that each period’s forecasts were taken from the participants and were then randomly shuf-
ﬂed and re-assigned back to the survey participants. Would the realised historical distribution of
forecaster performance be signiﬁcantly different from those obtained from this random re-shufﬂing?
If not, then we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal underlying forecaster ability.
To be more concrete, we apply our bootstrap technique in a way that exactly mimics the unbal-
anced nature of the panel we are using (the Philadelphia Fed Survey of Professional Forecasters.)
Thus, corresponding to the true Forecaster 3, who joined the SPF survey in 1968:Q4 and stayed in
the sample up to 1979:Q4, our bootstrapped distributions also contain a Forecaster 3 who joined
and left at the same times. However, in our simulations, the forecast errors corresponding to each
period are randomly re-assigned across forecasters within that period. In other words, our bootstrap
simulations can be thought of as a re-running of history so that, for example they contain a period
called 1970:Q2, in which the set of forecasts actually handed in that period are randomly assigned
to our simulated forecasters.4 We do not reassign errors across periods, so our simulated forecasters
for 1970:Q2 cannot be randomly assigned a forecast error corresponding to some other period.
Once we have assigned errors for each period, we calculate overall scores for each simulated
forecaster using equation (4) and save the resulting distribution of scores. We then repeat this pro-
cess 1,000 times, so that we have 1,000 simulated distributions, each based on randomly reassigning
4The results below do this re-assignment with replacement, so that the each forecaster is assigned a forecast drawn
from the same full distribution and the same individual forecast can be assigned twice. Results are essentially identical
when we assign the errors without replacement.6 ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS?
the errors corresponding to each period. This allows us to calculate the percentiles associated with
each point in the distribution under the null hypothesis of equal forecaster ability.
For example, suppose we want to consider the best-performing forecaster. We can compare his
or her outcome with both the median “best performer” from our 1,000 draws, i.e. the “typical”
best performer from a random reassignment distribution. We can also compare their performance
with the 5th and 95th percentiles, which give us an indication of the range that may be observed
in “best performer” scores under random reassignment. If the best performer in the actual data is
truly signiﬁcantly better than his or her peers, we would expect their score to lie outside the range
represented by these bootstrap percentiles.
3. Application to the Survey of Professional Forecasters
The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) provides the most comprehensive database available
to assess forecaster performance. It began in 1968 as a survey conducted by the American Statistical
Association and the National Bureau for Economic Research and was taken over by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in 1990. Participants in the SPF are drawn primarily from business
with the survey being conducted around the middle of each quarter.
In our analysis we look at the quarterly predictions for output and its deﬂator.5 We construct
forecast errors for two horizons: h = 1, which corresponds to a “nowcast” for the current quarter
and h = 5, which corresponds to the one year ahead forecast error. Output and inﬂation data are
continuously revised and thus for each quarter several measures of both variables are available. Fol-
lowing Romer and Romer (2000), we construct the errors using the ﬁgures which were published
two quarters following the date being forecasted. In other words, we assume that the aim of partic-
ipants was to forecast the variable according to the measurement conventions that prevailed when
the forecast was being collected.
The measure of output is Gross National Product (GNP) until 1991 and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) from 1992 onwards. The evaluation sample begins in 1968:Q4 and ends in 2009:Q3. In total
N = 309 forecasters appear in the survey over the time period and the average amount of time spent
in the sample is ﬁve years or twenty forecasts.
5The data used are taken from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS? 7
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the raw data used in our analysis. It shows the forecast
errors for the nowcast of inﬂation and output over the entire sample (1968 - 2009) with lines of
different colours corresponding to different individual forecasters. Two aspects of these data are
worth commenting on.
First, it is clear that for most periods, there were signiﬁcant correlations across forecasters in
their errors, so that for some quarters almost all errors are positive while for other periods almost
all are negative. The importance of this common component is why our measure of perfomance
normalises the individual squared errors by the average squared error for that period. Second,
the signiﬁcant reduction in variation in the forecast errors from the mid-1980s onwards, which
correspondswiththe“greatmoderation”, isnotable. Thisresulthasbeencommenteduponbeforeby
Stock and Watson (2005, 2006) and D’Agostino, Giannone and Surico (2006) amongst others from
a forecasting perspective. In our analysis, we assess the robustness of our ﬁndings by performing
our analysis on pre- and post-moderation samples as well as the full sample.
4. Results
We present our results in two ways, graphically and in tables.
4.1. Results for All Forecasters
Table 1 provides the results from applying our method to the full sample of 309 forecasters. The
ﬁgures in the rows of the table are the scores corresponding to various percentiles of the empirical
distribution of forecasting performance for our four types of forecasts (GDP current quarter and next
year, inﬂation over the current quarter and over the next year). The ﬁgures in brackets correspond
to the ﬁfth and ninety-ﬁfth percentiles generated from our bootstrap distributions.
Table 1 can be read as follows. Taking the ﬁgures in the ﬁrst row, 0.249 is the score obtained
by the forecaster who was placed at the ﬁfth percentile in projecting current quarter GDP i.e. the
forecaster who performed better than 95 percent of other forecasters. The ﬁgures underneath (0.156-
0.326) correspond to the ﬁfth and ninety-ﬁfth percentiles of the 1000 simulated scores for forecast-
ers who placed in this position. In other words, ﬁve percent of our bootstrap simulations produced8 ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS?
ﬁfth percentile scores less than 0.156 and ﬁve percent produced ﬁfth percentile scores greater than
0.326 (since these are average normalised square errors, low scores indicate a good performance).
Because the realized ﬁrst-percentile score of 0.249 ﬁts comfortably in between these two ﬁgures,
we can conclude that the actual ﬁfth percentile forecasters of current quarter GDP were not statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly different from what would be obtained under a distribution consistent with equal
underlying ability.
More generally, the results from this table show that scores of the top performing forecasters—
those in the upper ﬁfth percentiles for forecasting current quarter inﬂation as well as year-ahead
forecasts for GDP and inﬂation—are generally well inside the ninety ﬁfth percentile bootstrap in-
tervals generated from random reassignment. The middle percentiles of the empirical distribution
have scores that are lower than the bootstrap distribution (implying lower errors for these percentiles
than generated under the null of equal underlying ability). Because the average scores from the re-
alised and bootstrap distributions are the same by construction, these are offset by scores for the
poorer forecasters that are higher than the bootstrap distributions.
This pattern is not well picked up by the speciﬁc percentiles reported in Table 1 but can be
understood better from Figure 2. This ﬁgure shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) from
the SPF data (the dark line) along with the ﬁfth, median, and ninety-ﬁfth bootstrap percentiles for
each position in the distribution (the blue lines). The empirical CDF generally stays close to these
bootstrap distributions, with the main deviations being somewhat lower scores in the middle of the
empirical distribution being offset by somewhat higher scores for some of the weakest performers.
(These patterns are a bit hard to see for current quarter forecasts for inﬂation because the scores for
some of the poor performers are so big relative to the majority of other participants.)
4.2. Results for Smaller Samples of Forecasters
One potential problem with these results is that they treat all forecasters equally, whether they
contributed two forecasts and then left the SPF panel or whether they stayed in the panel for ten
years. Thus, some of the “best” forecasters—both in the data and in our bootstrap simulations—are
people (either real or imagined) who participated in a small number of surveys and got lucky. So,
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square error of 0.000; similarly, the ﬁfth bootstrap percentiles for best forecasters are also zero.
To reduce the inﬂuence of those forecasters who participated in a small number of editions of the
survey, we repeat our exercise excluding all forecasters who provided less than ten forecasts. Thus,
we restrict our attention to those who have participated in the survey for at least two and a half years.
Table 2 and Figure 3 provide the results from this exercise. In relation to the best forecasters,
the results here are mixed. The best forecasters for current quarter inﬂation and year-ahead GDP
are signiﬁcantly better than those generated by the bootstrap simulations while the best forecasters
for current quarter GDP and year-ahead inﬂation are not. However, beyond the very top of the
distribution, the forecasters in the top half of the distribution generally all have scores that are
superior to those generated from the bootstrapping exercise. That said, what emerges most clearly
from Figure 3 is that these signiﬁcantly low scores are offset by a relatively small number of very
bad performances that are far worse than predicted by the bootstrap distributions. In other words,
the empirical distribution differs mainly from those generated under the null hypothesis of equal
forecaster performance in having a small number of very bad forecasters.
This result provides an answer to the question posed in our title. Some forecasters really are
better than others. However, a better way to phrase this result would be that some forecasters really
are worse than others. This raises a ﬁnal question: If we excluded those forecasters who clearly
performed badly, can we ﬁnd evidence that there are signiﬁcant differences among the rest. To get
at the answer to this question, we re-run our bootstrapping exercise, still excluding those with less
than ten forecasts but this time also excluding those forecasters who scored worse than the eightieth
percentile. These results are presented in Table 3 and Figure 4.
We draw two principal conclusions from these results. First, in relation to the best forecasters
in the SPF, these performances are not statistically different relative to the upper ends of the dis-
tributions generated from the bootstrap exercise based on randomly reassigning the forecasts from
this best eightieth percent of forecasters. Second, looking at Figure 4, the empirical distributions
for GDP and inﬂation at both horizons are, at almost all points in the distribution, very close to the
bootstrap distributions.
The principal conclusion that we draw from these results is that apart from the strong evidence
that there is some forecasters who perform very poorly in the SPF, perhaps because they do not take10 ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS?
participation in the survey very seriously, there is limited evidence for innate differences between
the remaining eighty percent or so of participating forecasters.
4.3. Pre- and Post-1985 Samples
Asaﬁnalexercise, weperformedouranalysisusingsamplesrestrictedtothepre-andpost-moderation,
which we date here as 1985. It may be that the nature of forecasting changed signiﬁcantly with the
onset of this moderation, so it may be worth checking whether these two periods generate very dif-
ferent results. Figures 5 and 9 show the data for individual forecast errors from these two periods,
while Figures 6-8 and Figures 10-12 replicate Figures 2-4 for these separate two samples.
While there are some differences the general ﬂavour of the results are pretty similar across
the two time periods. The unrestricted distributions (including all forecasters, Figures 6 and 10)
are very similar to the bootstrap distributions, particularly for those with low average error scores.
When attention is restricted to those with ten or more forecasts (Figures 7 and 11) there is some
evidence that the better performers have lower scores than generated by the bootstrap distributions,
particularly for inﬂation. However, these deviations are mainly accounted for by the very poor
perfomances of a small number of bad forecasters. When attention is restricted to the best 80
percent of forecasters (Figures 8 and 12) the shape of the actual distributions are generally very
close to those generated by the bootstrap with random reassignment.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a new test for assessing whether performance differences among forecast-
ers reﬂect innate differences in forecasting ability and applies the test to data from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. We calculate a distribution of the performance of individual forecasters—
based on a new measure of forecasting performance that combines the relative performance of the
forecaster with the absolute scale of their errors—and compare these distributions with the out-
comes that would have been obtained had the actual forecasts been randomly reassigned to different
forecasters each period.
Basedonforecastsforoutputandinﬂationovertheperiod1968to2009, ourresultssuggestthere
islimitedevidencefortheideathatsomeforecastersareinnatelybetterthanothers, i.e. thatthereisaARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS? 11
small number of really good forecasters. A sizeable minority are, however, found to be signiﬁcantly
worse than the bootstrap estimate. Simulations show that the presence of this underperforming
group tends to result in a rather ﬂattering appraisal of forecasters at the upper end of the performance
scale. However, once the sample is restricted to exclude the worst-performing quintile, there is very
limited evidence for some forecasters signiﬁcantly outperforming the rest.
On balance, we conclude that most of the participants in the Survey of Professional Forecasters
appear to have approximately equal forecasting ability.12 ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS?
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Table 1: Distribution of Forecasting Performance With Bootstrap 5th and 95th Percentiles
Percentiles
1 quarter Best 5 25 50 75 Worst
GDP 0.016 0.249 0.578 0.792 1.170 21.501
(0.000 - 0.025) (0.156-0.326) (0.632-0.710) (0.866-0.927) (1.116-1.206) (3.743 - 15.802)
Inﬂation 0.000 0.232 0.536 0.761 1.189 9.622
(0.000-0.022) (0.178-0.319) (0.606-0.687) (0.850-0.918) (1.127-1.227) (3.718 - 16.037)
1 year Best 5 25 50 75 Worst
GDP 0.016 0.316 0.571 0.793 1.154 8.758
(0.008-0.131) (0.212-0.384) (0.642-0.715) (0.861-0.923) (1.104-1.192) (3.622-22.009)
Inﬂation 0.033 0.359 0.627 0.798 1.143 7.615
(0.000 - 0.058) (0.265-0.415) (0.660-0.730) (0.876-0.934) (1.113-1.200) (3.400 - 15.410)
Note: The table reports the empirical distribution of forecaster performance for 309 forcasters from the SPF. The measure
offorecasterperformance, whichistheaverageofthenormalisedsquarederror, Eit asdeﬁnedinequation(3)ofthepaper.
The ﬁgures in brackets refer to the ﬁfth and ninety-ﬁfth percentiles generated by the bootstrap distribution obtained under
the null hypothesis of equal forecaster ability.ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS? 15
Table 2: Distribution of Forecasting Performance: Restricted to Those With At Least 10 Forecasts
Percentiles
1 quarter Best 5 25 50 75 Worst
GDP 0.321 0.503 0.655 0.825 1.131 6.742
(0.255 - 0.482) (0.531 - 0.632) (0.756 - 0.817) (0.921 - 0.976) (1.112 - 1.191) (1.957 - 3.362)
Inﬂation 0.232 0.458 0.629 0.782 1.039 3.728
(0.243 - 0.455) (0.560 - 0.651) (0.760 - 0.822) (0.919 - 0.976) (1.105 - 1.182) (1.916 - 3.362)
1 year Best 5 25 50 75 Worst
GDP 0.321 0.500 0.635 0.836 1.146 2.901
(0.327 - 0.511) (0.537 - 0.632) (0.744 - 0.811) (0.912 - 0.972) (1.105 - 1.190) (1.986 - 4.035)
Inﬂation 0.408 0.500 0.695 0.883 1.111 4.720
(0.330 - 0.529) (0.560 - 0.651) (0.760 - 0.822) (0.919 - 0.976) (1.105 - 1.182) (1.916 - 3.362)
Note: The table reports the empirical distribution of forecaster performance for the 1xx forcasters who contributed at least
ten quarterly forecasts to the SPF between 1968 and 2009. The measure of forecaster performance, which is the average
of the normalised squared error, Eit as deﬁned in equation (3) of the paper. The ﬁgures in brackets refer to the ﬁfth
and ninety-ﬁfth percentiles generated by the bootstrap distribution obtained under the null hypothesis of equal forecaster
ability.16 ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS?
Table 3: Distribution of Forecasting Performance: Best 80 Percent With At Least 10 Forecasts
Percentiles
1 quarter Best 5 25 50 75 Worst
GDP 0.405 0.591 0.728 0.935 1.178 2.171
(0.320 - 0.560) (0.589 - 0.693) (0.805 - 0.863) (0.949 - 0.997) (1.100 - 1.165) (1.640 - 2.538)
Inﬂation 0.337 0.593 0.751 0.940 1.166 2.381
(0.301 - 0.545) (0.577 - 0.685) (0.800 - 0.859) (0.948 - 0.997) (1.103 - 1.170) (1.666 - 2.598)
1 year Best 5 25 50 75 Worst
GDP 0.436 0.641 0.795 0.944 1.156 1.952
(0.417 - 0.617) (0.624 - 0.719) (0.813 - 0.870) (0.946 - 0.995) (1.088 - 1.155) (1.605 - 2.476)
Inﬂation 0.438 0.595 0.806 0.972 1.182 2.144
(0.389 - 0.612) (0.628 - 0.724) (0.821 - 0.876) (0.953 - 0.999) (1.092 - 1.155) (1.558 - 2.347)
Note: The table reports the empirical distribution of forecaster performance for the best-performing eighty percent of
the 1xx forcasters who contributed at least ten quarterly forecasts to the SPF between 1968 and 2009. The measure of
forecaster performance, which is the average of the normalised squared error, Eit as deﬁned in equation (3) of the paper.
The ﬁgures in brackets refer to the ﬁfth and ninety-ﬁfth percentiles generated by the bootstrap distribution obtained under
the null hypothesis of equal forecaster ability.ARE SOME FORECASTERS REALLY BETTER THAN OTHERS? 17
Figure 1: Output and Inﬂation Forecast Errors
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Figure 2: Actual and Bootstrap Distributions (5th, 50th, 95th Percentiles): All Forecasters
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Figure 4: Actual and Bootstrap Distributions: Minimum of Ten Forecasts (Best 80 Percent)
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Pre-85 Sample
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Figure 7: Actual and Bootstrap Distributions: Minimum of Ten Forecasts
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Figure 8: Actual and Bootstrap Distributions: Minimum of Ten Forecasts (Best 80 Percent)
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Post-85 Sample
Figure 9: Output and Inﬂation Forecast Errors
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Figure 11: Actual and Bootstrap Distributions: Minimum of Ten Forecasts (Best 80 Percent)
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